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2.1  Introduction 
For the last three years, beginning with the Plaza Communique of September 
1985, governments have been hard at work on policy coordination, including 
the improvement of the process itself. We have seen nothing like it since the 
mid-1970s and the run-up to the Bonn Economic Summit of 1978. Economists 
have  also  been  at  work,  modeling  and  measuring  the  gains  from  policy 
coordination and devising new approaches.  But some have turned against it. 
The obstacles are large, they say, the potential gains are small, and there is the 
risk that governments  will  get it wrong-that  macroeconomic  coordination 
will make matters worse. 
Some  economists  were  skeptical  initially.  In  1981, for  example,  Max 
Corden  argued  that  coordination  is  not  needed  because  the  international 
monetary  “non-system”  has a logic of its own: 
The key feature of  the present system is that it is a form of international 
laissez-faire. First of all, it allows free play to the private market, not just 
to trade in goods and non-financial services but, above all, to the private 
capital market. Secondly, it allows free play to governments and their central 
banks to operate in the market and-if  they wish and where they can-to 
influence and  even fix its prices or its quantities.  Thus it is a fairly free 
market where many governments,  acting in their own presumed interests 
and not necessarily taking much account of the interests of other govern- 
ments, are participants.  (60). 
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Roland  Vaubel (1981) went  even further, arguing that  governments should 
compete in providing  the  most  attractive  economic environment, measured 
primarily by price stability, and that policy coordination is harmful because it 
reduces competition among governments. Coordination can also raise the costs 
of  policy  mistakes  because  governments will  do  the  same wrong  things 
collectively rather than make mutually canceling errors. 
On Corden’s “market”  view, each government can and should be free to 
choose its own monetary and fiscal policies but also to choose its exchange rate 
arrangements and decide for itself whether to borrow or lend on international 
capital markets. This sort of policy decentralization would probably be optimal 
if  all  economies  were  very  small; each  country’s decisions regarding  its 
exchange rate  would  have  only trivial  effects on other countries’ effective 
exchange rates, and its decisions to borrow  or lend  would  not  have  much 
influence on world interest rates. 
What happens, however, when economies are large? Each country’s policies 
affect other countries, and  structural  interdependence  gives rise in turn  to 
policy interdependence. The conventional case for coordination starts here. ’ 
But the strength of the case depends on the extent of the underlying structural 
interdependence, the  governments’ policy  objectives,  and  the  number  of 
policy instruments at their command. 
Stanley Fischer (1988) has surveyed recent research on these issues and has 
joined the skeptics: 
The notion of international policy coordination is appealing and appears to hold 
out the promise of major improvements in economic performance.  However, 
estimates of the quantitative impacts of  policy decisions in one economy on 
other economies are quite small. These results. together with explicit calcula- 
tions ofthe benefits of coordination, suggest the gains will rarely be significant. 
Furthermore,  theoretical  analysis  finds  many  circumstances  under  which 
coordination worsens rather than improves economic performance. 
The interest in policy coordination in the United States has been strongest 
when  advocates  of  coordination  were  hoping  to use  international  policy 
agreements to bring about changes in domestic policies that they regarded 
as either undesirable or eventually untenable.  It is entirely possible though 
that formal coordination  would sometimes require  a country to undertake 
policy actions of  which it disapproved. 
So long as exchange rates remain flexible-and  they will likely remain 
flexible among the three major currency areas-macroeconomic  policy co- 
ordination among the major blocs is unlikely to advance beyond the provision 
of  mutual information and occasional agreements for specific policy trade- 
offs. Both information exchanges and occasional policy agreements when 
the circumstances are right are useful and should be encouraged. 
But  more  consistent  ongoing policy  coordination  in  which  countries, 
including  the  United  States,  significantly  modify  national  policies  “in 
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izon.  Fortunately,  the  evidence  suggests that  the  potential  gains  from 
coordination are in any event small: the best that each country can do for 
other countries is to keep its own economy in shape. (38-39). 
Martin Feldstein was even blunter in comments written shortly after the stock 
market crash of October 1987: 
Unfortunately, ever since the 1985 Plaza meeting, the [U.S.] administration 
and the governments of other industrial nations have emphatically asserted 
that international economic coordination is crucial to a healthy international 
economy in general and to continued U.S. growth in particular. Since such 
assertions are not justified  by the actual interdependence  of the industrial 
economies, Americans have been  inappropriately  womed about  whether 
coordination would  continue. 
Because foreign governments will inevitably pursue the policies that they 
believe are in their own best interests, it was inevitable that international 
coordination  would  eventually collapse. . . . But what contributed  to the 
market  decline  was  not  the  collapse  of  international  macroeconomic 
coordination  per se but the false impression  created by governments that 
healthy expansion requires such coordination. 
The U.S. should now in a clear but  friendly way end the international 
coordination  of  macroeconomic policy.  We  should  continue to cooperate 
with other governments by exchanging information about current and future 
policy decisions, but we should recognize explicitly that Japan and Germany 
have the right to pursue the monetary and fiscal policies that they believe are 
in their own best interests. 
It  is frightening  to the American public  and upsetting  to our financial 
markets to believe that the fate of our economy depends on the decisions 
made in Bonn and Tokyo. Portfolio investors, business managers  and the 
public in general need to be reassured that we are not hostages to foreign 
economic policies, that the U.S. is the master of its own economic destiny, 
and that our government can and will do what is needed to maintain healthy 
economic growth (Feldstein  1987). 
When thoughtful economists like Fischer and Feldstein express themselves 
this forcefully, policymakers should listen. But when they listen carefully, they 
are likely to conclude that two quite different concepts of coordination are at 
issue. The critics of  coordination  are castigating  governments for pursuing 
objectives  that  bear very  little  resemblance to the  objectives that  actually 
animate the governments’ own efforts. 
Economists  typically adopt what can be described  as a policy-optimizing 
approach  to  coordination,* and  their  use  of  game-theoretic  methods  to 
represent that process has led them to treat the participating governments as 
antagonists engaged in what Putnam and Henning (1986) have described  as 
policy barter-the  trading of  commitments about policy instruments without 
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exchange rate stabilization does not play a central role; it is at most a method 
for optimizing policies and is usually a second-best method at that. 
Governments, by  contrast,  appear to adopt  what  can  be  described  as a 
regime-preserving  or public  goods approach  to policy  coordination. It  has 
different implications for the ways in which governments interact and for the 
role  of  exchange rate  stabilization. Mutual  persuasion  takes  the  place  of 
adversarial  bargaining;  exchange rate  stabilization  becomes  a  public  good 
rather than a rule for optimizing policies. Furthermore, the regime-preserving 
approach sheds light on certain puzzling questions: Why does policy coordi- 
nation  move  in  and  out  of  fashion? Why  are disagreements about  policy 
objectives cited so often as “obstacles”  to coordination, when they can be 
expected  to raise  the  gains from  policy-optimizing  coordination? Why  do 
governments argue about sharing the “burdens”  of coordination, when each 
of  them should be expected to benefit from policy optimization? 
2.2  Perspectives on Policy Coordination 
Governments engage in many  forms of  economic cooperation. They ex- 
change information about their economies, policies, and forecasts. They pro- 
vide financial assistance to other governments, bilaterally and multilaterally, 
ranging from balance of payments support to long-term development aid. They 
act jointly to supervise or regulate  various sorts of  economic activity. 
Coordination is the most rigorous form of economic cooperation because it 
involves mutually agreed modifications in the participants’ national policies. 
In the macroeconomic domain, it involves an exchange of explicit, operational 
commitments about the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. Commitments 
of  this  sort can be  framed  contingently,  with reference  to  mutually  agreed 
norms or targets; a government can promise to cut taxes, for example, if the 
growth  rate  of  real  GNP or nominal  demand is  lower than  the  rate  it  has 
promised  to deliver.  But  commitments to targets,  by  themselves, do not 
constitute coordination. Commitments about instruments are the distinguish- 
ing  feature  of  coordination, setting  it  apart from other forms of  economic 
cooperation.’ 
2.2.1  Forms of  Coordination 
Coordination  can  result  from  episodic  bargaining  about  specific  policy 
packages or from a once-for-all  bargain about policy rules or guidelines. 
The Bonn Summit of 1978 is usually cited as the leading instance of episodic 
bargaining, although  the Bonn bargain  was not confined to macroeconomic 
matters.  The Federal Republic  of Germany and Japan made promises  about 
their  fiscal policies,  and the United  States made promises about  its energy 
policies (Putnam and Bayne 1987, ch. 4). The Bretton Woods Agreement of 67  Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies 
1944 is sometimes cited as a once-for-all bargain about rules, although it was 
too vague to meet my definition  of full-fledged  coordination.  The exchange 
rate  obligations  were  explicit; the corresponding  policy commitments  were 
implicit. The latter became somewhat tighter, however, as the Bretton Woods 
system evolved. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to attach strict 
policy  conditions  to  the  use  of  its  resources,  and  Working  Party  3  of  the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD) devoted 
close attention to the macroeconomic  side of  the exchange rate system. 
These arrangements began to resemble rule-based policy coordination, but 
some would say that they were not symmetrical enough. The obligations of 
deficit countries were more clearly defined and commonly accepted than those 
of  surplus countries. But symmetry is different from reciprocity or mutuality. 
The Bretton Woods system was not symmetrical-although  the most striking 
asymmetries arose from the special role of the dollar rather than the imbalance 
between obligations borne by deficit and surplus countries. Nevertheless,  the 
obligations were mutual in the important contingent sense emphasized earlier. 
They applied in principle to every country when it ran a balance of payments 
deficit. (Concern to preserve this contingent mutuality explains the reluctance 
of the IMF to depart from the uniform treatment of its members when attaching 
conditions to the use of its resources.) 
The Louvre Accord of  1987 can be described as a combination of the two 
techniques  for policy  coordination.  There  were  rule-based  obligations,  too 
loosely defined perhaps, which linked the use of interest rate policies to the 
maintenance of exchange rate stability.  There was an ad hoc bargain about 
fiscal policies, although it served mainly to codify the goals that governments 
had already chosen  nila ate rally.^ 
A  number  of  rule-based  systems  have  been  proposed  in  recent  years, 
including those of  McKinnon (1984, 1988), Meade (1984), and Williamson 
and Miller (1987).  McKinnon  proposes  a gold  standard without  gold. The 
major central banks would choose an appropriate growth rate for the global 
money stock and would then conduct their monetary policies to realize that 
growth rate. Each of them would also use nonsterilized intervention to peg its 
exchange rate, causing its national money stock to grow faster than the global 
stock when its currency was strong and more slowly than the global stock when 
its currency was weak. The system would work symmetrically, however, so 
that  exchange  rate  pegging  would  not  affect  the  growth  rate of  the global 
money stock. The Williamson-Miller proposal would not peg exchange rates 
but is more comprehensive than McKinnon’s proposal; it covers fiscal policies 
as well  as interest rate  or monetary  p~licies.~  Because  it would  involve a 
rule-based bargain to coordinate national policies, and we will discuss it later, 
the Williamson-Miller framework is reproduced as figure 2.1. 
The distinction between types of policy bargains-between  ad hoc agree- 
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helpful in sorting out arguments and issues. But it is far less fundamental than 
the distinction drawn in the introduction to this paper, which pertains  to the 
rationale for policy coordination. 
2.2.2  The Policy-Optimizing Approach 
Many economists look upon policy formation as an optimizing process and 
are thus inclined to treat policy coordination as an extension of  that process. 
Each government is deemed to have a welfare function defined in terms of its 
policy targets, and it sets its policy instruments to maximize that function. Its 
actions  may  affect  other  governments’  decisions,  but  it  disregards  that 
possibility.  When all governments behave this way, however, they end up in 
a suboptimal situation,  the  noncooperative  or Nash equilibrium. They have 
neglected  the  policy  interdependence  resulting  from  structural  interdepen- 
dence, and they can bargain their way to a better situation, the cooperative or 
Pareto equilibrium.  By changing the settings of  their policy instruments in a 
mutually agreed manner, they can get closer to their policy targets and raise 
each country’s welfare.6 
The Blueprint 
The participating countries [the Group of Seven] agree that they will conduct their macroeconomic 
policies with  a view to pursuing the following two intermediate targets: 
(1) A rate of growth of domestic demand in each country calculated according to a formula 
designed to promote the fastest growth of output consistent with gradual reduction of  inflation to 
an  acceptable lcvcl and agreed adjustment of  the current account of the balance of payments. 
(2) A  real  effective  exchange  that  will  not  deviate  by  more  than  [lo] percent  from  an 
internationally agreed estimate of the “fundamental equilibrium exchange rate.”  the rate estimated 
to he consistent with simultaneous internal and external balance in the medium term. 
To  that end, the participants  agree that they  will modify their monetary and  fiscal policies 
according to the following principles: 
’  The average level of world (real) short-term interest rates should be revised up (down) if 
aggregate growth of national income is threatening to exceed (fall short of)  the sum of  the 
targel growth of nominal demand for the participating countries. 
DiSfErences in short-term interest rates among countries should be revised when necessary 
to supplement intervention in the exchange markets to prevent the deviation of  currencies 
from their target ranges. 
Nationalfiscul policies should be revised with a view to achieving national target rates of 
growth of domestic demand. 
The rules (A) to (C) should be constrained by  the medium-term objective of  maintaining the 
real interest rate in its historically normal range and of avoiding an increasing or excessive ratio 
of  public debt to GNP. 
Figure 2.1 
Source;  Williamson and Miller (1987, 2); brackets and italics in original. 
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Viewed from this standpoint, policy coordination serves to internalize the 
effects of economic interdependence, which no single government can capture 
on its own by  setting its policies unilaterally.  To use a different metaphor, 
policy coordination gives each government partial control over other govem- 
ments’ policy instruments. Therefore, it relieves the shortage of instruments 
that prevents each government from reaching its own targets (see, e.g., Buiter 
and Eaton  1985, and Eichengreen  1985). 
No one can quarrel with the logic of the policy-optimizing approach. It has 
given precise operational  meaning to the notion of policy  interdependence, 
provided a framework for measuring the costs of neglecting it, and linked this 
special subject with the much larger literature on macroeconomic theory and 
policy.  But  it  tends  to  be  more  normative  than  positive.  It  tells  us  what 
governments  can hope to achieve by  multinational  optimization  and warns 
against some of the risks. It is less useful, however, in helping us to understand 
what governments are actually trying to accomplish, the obstacles they face, 
and the institutional arrangements they employ. 
2.2.3  The Regime-Preserving  Approach 
Some economists, many political scientists, and most policymakers look at 
policy coordination from a different ~tandpoint.~  It is needed to produce certain 
public goods and defend the international economic system from economic and 
political  shocks, including misbehavior by governments themselves. 
Much of this  important work  was done by  the United  States in the  first 
two  postwar  decades. It was the  hegemonic  power,  having  the  ability and 
self-interested concern to stabilize the world economy by its actions. Further- 
more, it had been largely responsible for writing the rules of the system and 
designing the institutions. It could thus be expected to defend them whenever 
they  were  threatened.  Equally  important,  other  governments  could  not 
accomplish very  much  without American cooperation.  Matters  are different 
now. It is still difficult to get very far without American cooperation, and little 
is likely to happen until Washington decides that something must be done. But 
the United States cannot act alone. The economic and political  costs are too 
high. 
It  is  easy  to  find  examples of  regime-preserving  cooperation  in  recent 
economic history. They include the mobilization of financial support for the 
dollar and sterling in the 1960s and the joint management of the London gold 
pool, the “rescue”  of the dollar in 1978, the speedy provision of bridge loans 
to Mexico at the start of the debt crisis in 1982, and the Plaza Communiquk 
of  1985, which was meant to defend  the trade regime  rather than alter the 
exchange rate regime. 
The bargain  struck at Bonn in  1978 can likewise be described as regime- 
preserving coordination.  It reflected  an agreed need for collective action on 
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to combat rising  unemployment, especially  in  Europe, and for energy con- 
servation to reduce the industrial countries’ dependence on imported oil and 
limit the ability of  OPEC to raise oil prices. 
When viewed from this different perspective, policy coordination becomes 
the  logical  response  to the  dispersion  of  power  and  influence  that  ended 
American  hegemony.  Public  goods must  be  produced  and  institutional  ar- 
rangements defended by common or collective  action. When seen this way, 
moreover, disagreements  about the benefits and costs of policy coordination 
take on a different  but  familiar  aspect. They become debates about burden 
sharing. 
2.3  Two Views of Exchange Rate Management 
The two views of  policy  coordination  yield  different  ways of  looking  at 
exchange rate  management. Seen from the policy-optimizing  viewpoint, it 
involves the use of  a simple policy rule to internalize the effects of economic 
interdependence.  Seen from the regime-preserving viewpoint, it embodies a 
commitment by governments to improve the global economic environment by 
pursuing  exchange rate stability  as a policy  objective (strictly  speaking, an 
intermediate  objective  conducive to  the  pursuit  of  stable and liberal  trade 
policies and an efficient allocation of resources nationally and globally). 
2.3.1  Exchange Rates in the Policy-Optimizing  Framework 
The earliest theoretical work on policy-optimizing coordination dealt mainly 
with the pegged rate case. Recent work has taken the opposite tack, partly 
because of  the change in the actual exchange rate regime and partly because 
mathematical  tractability exerts an unfortunate influence on the economist’s 
research agenda. 
Although many economists doubt that exchange rate expectations are truly 
rational,  they  tend  to disparage any  other view.  Yet  it  is  hard  to  solve a 
theoretical model in which rational expectations are combined with imperfect 
capital  mobility.  Accordingly,  most  such models assume that  foreign  and 
domestic  assets are  perfect  substitutes. On this  assumption, however,  ex- 
change rate  pegging  precludes  any  other use  of  monetary  policy,  greatly 
reducing the scope for policy coordination.’  Therefore, exchange rate pegging 
is typically viewed as a second-best alternative to fully optimal coordination. 
It is attractive mainly because a simple, rule-based  regime is less vulnerable 
to cheating  or reneging, which  many economists have regarded  as a major 
obstacle to fully optimal coordination  (see, e.g., Canzoneri and Gray  1985, 
and McKibbin and Sachs 1986). 
When foreign and domestic assets are imperfect  substitutes, however, the 
case for exchange rate pegging becomes much stronger, even in the policy- 
optimizing framework. Purchases and sales of foreign assets (intervention) can 
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market operations) can be used to pursue domestic policy objectives.  Using 
this  framework  to ask how exchange rate arrangements  affect the need  for 
policy-optimizing  coordination, I  have  reached  an  unorthodox  conclusion 
(Kenen 1987a, 1988~).  A simple agreement to peg exchange rates, without any 
additional coordination, is better from each government’s national standpoint 
than an agreement to let rates float and pursue fully optimal coordination. This 
is because exchange rate arrangements affect the ways in which exogenous 
shocks influence outputs and prices. 
Working with a standard portfolio-balance model, I have studied the effects 
of various exogenous shocks, including fiscal policy shocks, under pegged and 
floating rates  and  asked how  those  two exchange rate  regimes  affect each 
government’s ability to stabilize its output and price level on its own, without 
attempting to coordinate its monetary policy with those of other countries. In 
effect, I have used the policy-optimizing  framework to look anew at an old 
question, whether a floating exchange rate can confer policy autonomy on the 
governments  of  interdependent  economies.  It  cannot.  On the  contrary,  a 
pegged exchange rate proves to be superior in three of the five cases studied 
(a permanent  shift  in  demand  between  the  countries’  bonds,  a  temporary 
increase in  one country’s  saving reflecting  a permanent  increase  in desired 
wealth, and a balanced budget increase in one government’s spending). The 
ranking  of  exchange rate  regimes  is  ambiguous  in  the other two  cases  (a 
permanent  switch in demand between the countries’ goods and a permanent 
increase in one country’s stock of  debt resulting from a temporary tax cut). 
My  model  is summarized  in  the  appendix  to this  paper.  It contains  two 
countries, the U.S. and EC, each with its own good, bond, and currency. The 
two goods and bonds are traded and are imperfect substitutes; each currency 
is held only in the  issuing country. Asset markets and  goods markets clear 
continuously, but goods prices are sticky. An increase in demand for the U.S. 
good, for example, does not raise its dollar price immediately. There is instead 
a temporary  increase  in U.S. output.  But  wages and prices  start to rise in 
response to the increase in output, and they go on rising until output returns 
to its long-run equilibrium level. U.S. bonds are dollar bonds issued by the 
U.S. government when it runs a budget deficit; EC bonds are ecu bonds issued 
by  the EC government.  The two countries’ money supplies are managed by 
their central banks, using open ma.rket operations in their own bond markets. 
When the exchange rate is pegged, however, money supplies are affected by 
intervention  in  the  foreign-exchange  market;  intervention  can  be  sterilized 
when, as here, two countries’ bonds are imperfect substitutes, but sterilization 
is not automatic. 
Expectations are static, and the model begins in long-run equilibrium, where 
there is no saving or investment,  budgets and trade flows are balanced,  and 
prices  are  constant.  When  this  situation  is  disturbed, moreover,  the  two 
economies move gradually to a new long-run equilibrium,  driven by changes 
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gains or losses on holdings of foreign-currency bonds. Governments are well 
behaved.  They do not try to move their economies away from the stationary 
state but use their monetary policies merely to optimize the adjustment process 
initiated by an exogenous shock. Furthermore, each government has enough 
confidence in the other’s integrity to give it  open-ended access to reserves. 
Casting these assumptions in game-theoretic terms, each government may 
be  said to  start at the  bliss  point  defined  by  its own social welfare  (loss) 
function,  and their bliss points will be identical initially even if the govern- 
ments have different preferences.  Therefore, the Nash and Pareto equilibria 
will coincide. When the situation is disturbed, however, each government will 
seek to minimize the welfare loss resulting from the output and price effects 
of the shock. But there are two sorts of shocks. Some can be shown to shift 
both bliss points together, so that the Nash and Pareto equilibria will continue 
to coincide. In these special cases, each government can use its own monetary 
policy to neutralize completely the output and price effects of the shock and 
thus move directly to its new bliss point. There is no welfare loss and no need 
for policy coordination.  Other shocks can be shown to shift the bliss points 
differently, so that the Nash and Pareto equilibria will no longer coincide, and 
monetary policies cannot be expected to neutralize the output and price effects 
of those shocks. Each government must then settle for a second-best solution, 
involving  a  departure from its  bliss  point  and  a  welfare  loss, and  policy 
coordination is needed to minimize that loss.’ 
This strategy is illustrated in figures 2.2 and 2.3, which focus on the pegged 
rate case. The vertical axis in figure 2.2 measures the permanent change in the 
U.S. price level resulting from an open market operation or exogenous shock, 
and the horizontal axis measures the temporary change in U.S. output. As the 
U.S. economy starts in long-run equilibrium and the U.S. government wants 
to stay there, the origin in figure 2.2  represents the U.S. bliss point in output 
and price space, and points on the elliptical indifference curve surrounding it 
are welfare-inferior to it. (There is, of course, one such curve for each value 
of the U.S. social welfare function.) The line BB and arrows on it show what 
happens to the U.S.  economy  when  the  U.S.  central bank  makes  an open 
market purchase.  Output rises temporarily,  and the price level rises perma- 
nently. The line FF and arrows on it show what happens when the EC central 
bank makes an open market purchase. Under a pegged exchange rate, the case 
considered here, the change in the U.S. price level will be the same when the 
size of the open market purchase is the same, but the change in U.S. output 
will be smaller. Therefore, FF is steeper than BB. 
The apparatus in figure 2.2. can be used to derive a reaction curve showing 
how the U.S. central bank responds to the effects of an open market purchase 
by the EC central bank. An EC open market purchase takes the U.S. economy 
to a point such as T’, and the options open to the U.S. central bank are shown 
by the line B’B’, parallel to BB. The best option is at H’, where B’B’ is tangent 
to the indifference curve; the U.S. central bank must make an open market sale 73  Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies 
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Fig. 2.2  U.S. policy preferences and policy responses 
to minimize the welfare loss resulting from the EC open market purchase. But 
the U.S. price level is higher at H' than at the origin, which says that the U.S. 
open market sale is smaller than the EC open market purchase. (The global 
money supply has risen, raising both countries'  prices.) 
Turning to figure 2.3, the vertical axis measures holdings of EC bonds by 
the EC central bank, and the horizontal axis measures holdings of U.S. bonds 
by the U.S. central bank. The point P is the initial U.S. bliss point and the EC 
bliss point too, because the EC economy also starts in long-run equilibrium and 
the EC government wants to stay there. The line I, is the U.S. reaction curve, 
showing how the U.S. central bank responds to an EC open market purchase. 
It is negatively sloped, because the U.S. central bank will make an open market 
sale, reducing its holdings of U.S. bonds. It is steeper absolutely than a 4.5" 
line, because the U.S. open market sale is smaller than the EC open market 
purchase. The line I,  is the EC reaction curve, derived from the EC counterpart 
of figure 2.2. 
Returning to figure 2.2, consider the effects of  an exogenous shock that 
drives  the  U.S.  economy  to  a  point  such  as  N',  depressing U.S.  output 
temporarily but having no permanent effect on the U.S. price level. (That is 
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to the EC bond.) The U.S. central bank  could go again to  H', accepting  a 
permanent increase in the U.S. price level in order to reduce the size of the 
temporary cut in U.S. output. But there is another possibility.  Suppose that 
the U.S. central bank makes an open market purchase large enough to take the 
U.S. economy from N' to T' and the EC central bank makes an open market 
sale large enough to take the U.S. economy from T' to the origin. The output 
and price effects of the shock will be neutralized completely. This outcome is 
shown in figure 2.3 by shifting the U.S. bliss point to P,,  where the EC central 
bank  holds fewer bonds and the U.S. central bank holds more bonds, then 
shifting the U.S. reaction curve from I, to 1; making it pass through the new 
U.S. bliss point. '" 
Now suppose that the same exogenous shock drives the EC economy to the 
EC counterpart of point N" in figure 2.2, raising EC output temporarily and 
having no permanent effect on the EC price level. The effects of the shock can 75  Coordination of  Macroeconomic Policies 
be neutralized completely if the EC central bank makes an open market sale 
large enough to take the EC economy from N” to T” and the U.S.  central bank 
makes an open market purchase large enough to take the EC economy from 
T” to the origin. In figure 2.3, the EC bliss point shifts to P,,  where the EC 
central bank holds fewer bonds and the U.S. central bank holds more bonds, 
and the new EC reaction curve must be I;. 
If  each central  bank  optimizes  its  policy  independently,  without  taking 
account of the other’s decisions, the two will wind up in Nash equilibrium at 
PN. If they coordinate their policies by some sort of bargaining, they will wind 
up in Pareto equilibrium at a point such as Pc, lying on the so-called contract 
curve connecting PI and P,,  and it is easy to prove that Pc  is better than PN 
from each country’s standpoint. Bliss points such as PI and P,  are surrounded 
by elliptical indifference curves, and two such curves are drawn in figure 2.3. 
They are the curves whose tangency defines the point Pc.  But U,, the U.S. 
indifference curve, cuts I; between PN  and P, ,  which says that the U.S.  welfare 
loss is smaller at Pc  than at p,  while U,,  the EC indifference curve, cuts 
I;  between PN  and P,,  which makes an analogous statement about EC welfare. 
These are the gains from policy-optimizing coordination. 
This sort of  policy  coordination  cannot neutralize completely  the output 
effects of  the shock; it can only minimize the resulting welfare losses.  The 
effects of a shock are neutralized  completely only when a government  can 
reach its new bliss point, and Pc  lies between those bliss points. If  the bliss 
points shifted together, however, they would continue to coincide, and the new 
reaction curves would intersect at the new common bliss point, just as they did 
initially. That is precisely  what happens under a pegged exchange rate. The 
bliss points shift together in three of the five cases studied, permitting the two 
central banks to neutralize completely the output and price effects of the shocks 
without having to coordinate their policies. 
2.3.2  Exchange Rates in the Regime-Preserving  Framework 
In the previous section, the policy-optimizing framework was used to prove 
that exchange rate pegging can substitute for more ambitious forms of policy 
coordination.  But two strong assumptions were needed. First, the two econ- 
omies were well behaved. They began in long-run equilibrium and returned 
to  it  after  every  shock.  Disturbances  were  permanent  but  did  not  have 
permanent effects on output. Second, governments were well behaved.  They 
did not defy or try to manipulate the long-run properties of their economies in 
ways that might have interfered with the viability of a pegged exchange rate. 
When these assumptions are violated, we step through the looking glass, from 
a  world  in  which  exchange  rate  pegging  reduces  the  need  for  policy 
coordination  to one  in  which  coordination  is  required  merely  to  achieve 
exchange-rate stability. 
When we take that step, moreover, we have to change our frame of refer- 
ence-to  shift from the policy-optimizing framework to the regime-preserving 
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public good, something that governments want but cannot produce individu- 
ally, it is hard to explain how exchange-rate stability can become the rationale 
for policy coordination. The critics of coordination go wrong here, but so do 
the  defenders.  They  debate  the  merits  of  the  Louvre  Accord  for  being 
something  different  than  it  was.  The G-7 governments  were  not  trying  to 
manage the global economy. They were trying to manage exchange rates. They 
started rather tentatively, hoping to keep the dollar from ‘‘overshooting”  and 
thus  allow  the  adjustment  process  to  work  itself  out,  but  became  more 
ambitious as time wore on. They deserve to be graded fairly, however, for what 
they were trying to accomplish and how they set about it, not by an extraneous 
standard. 
There is enough to debate even when the issues are narrowly defined by the 
regime-preserving  framework.  How much  importance should  governments 
attach to the production of exchange rate stability? What should they be willing 
to sacrifice in order to produce it? How much can they achieve by intervention? 
How closely must they  coordinate  their monetary  and fiscal policies? How 
frequently should they revise their exchange rate targets? Can they continue 
to  depend on informal  understandings  of  the  sort embodied  in the  Louvre 
Accord, or must they adopt more formal rules? Should exchange rate bands 
be hard and narrow, as in the Bretton Woods system and EMS,or soft and wide, 
as proposed by Williamson (I  985 [  1983])? Can governments reform exchange 
rate arrangements without reforming reserve arrangements? 
I have explored most of these issues elsewhere (Kenen 1987c, 1988a) and 
tried to show how they are linked. Thus, judgments about the feasibility of 
revising  exchange  rate  targets  must  condition  one’s judgments  about  the 
appropriate size of the exchange rate band, and the width of the band cannot 
be chosen without knowing whether it should be hard or soft. If a hard band 
is appropriate, moreover, intervention must play a major role in exchange rate 
management;  a  hard  band  cannot  be  defended  merely  by  manipulating 
short-term interest rates. But changes in reserve arrangements may be needed 
to facilitate and finance large amounts of  intervention. 
There have been remarkable changes in the importance that governments 
attach to exchange rate stability and in their self-confidence-what  they think 
they can achieve by altering or challenging the market’s expectations. 
At the Versailles Summit of  1982, the G-7 governments created a working 
group to study the role of intervention, and the group’s report was predictably 
critical of using it extensively. Intervention could be helpful in some special 
circumstances,  but mainly for drawing the market’s attention to the implica- 
tions of  monetary policies.  Intervention could not and should not be used to 
oppose market forces (Working Group 1983). The same view was expressed 
in a second, more comprehensive  report on the  monetary  system commis- 
sioned by the Williamsburg Summit in 1983. It worried about the volatility of 
floating exchange rates and warned that “large movements in real exchange 
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sustainable,”  but  it laid most of  the blame for exchange rate instability on 
“inadequate  and  inconsistent  policies  that  have  led to divergent  economic 
performance”  (Deputies  1985, paras.  17, 20). In  effect, governments  en- 
dorsed  the  view  then  prevalent  among  economists  that  foreign-exchange 
markets  process  information  efficiently  and  should  not  be blamed  for  the 
policies on which they are asked to pass judgment. That would be shooting the 
messenger who brings embarrassing news (Frenkel  1987). 
A  few  months  later,  however,  governments  took  a  different  view.  On 
September 22, 1985, in the Plaza Communique, they sent the messenger back 
to the market to say that the market was not doing its job: 
The Ministers and Governors agreed that exchange rates should play a role 
in adjusting external imbalances. In order to do this, exchange rates should 
better reflect fundamental economic conditions than has been the case. They 
believe that agreed policy  actions must be implemented and reinforced to 
improve  the  fundamentals  further,  and  that  in  view  of  the  present  and 
prospective changes in fundamentals, some further orderly appreciation of 
the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable.  They stand 
ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so would be 
helpful. 
And they took the next step in the Louvre Accord of February 22,  1987: 
The  Ministers  and  Governors  agreed  that  the  substantial  exchange-rate 
changes since the Plaza Agreement will increasingly contribute to reducing 
external imbalances and have now brought their currencies within ranges 
broadly  consistent  with  underlying  economic  fundamentals,  given  the 
policy commitments summarized  [earlier] in this statement. 
Further  substantial  exchange-rate  shifts  among  their  currencies  could 
damage growth and adjustment prospects in their countries. 
In current circumstances,  therefore,  they agreed to cooperate closely to 
foster stability of exchange rates around current levels. 
In the months that followed, the G-7 governments  intervened massively to 
support the dollar. They let it depreciate slightly in the spring but held it to a 
very narrow range thereafter,  until the stock market collapse in October. 
The rationale for trying to stabilize exchange rates can be summed up in two 
statements. Those who produce exchange rates in the foreign-exchange market 
are differently motivated from those who consume them in the markets for 
goods, services, and long-term assets. Furthermore, exchange rates are very 
flexible,  like  other  asset  prices,  whereas  goods prices  are  sticky,  so  that 
nominal and real exchange rates move together. 
A growing body of evidence supports the first assertion. Inhabitants of the 
foreign-exchange  market  have  been  shown  to  behave  myopically,  even 
irrationally,  ’ and this would be reason enough to challenge the conventional 
wisdom of  the early  1980s, which held that markets are wiser than govern- 
ments.  But  the  second  assertion  is  more  important. If  goods  prices  were 78  Peter B. Kenen 
perfectly  flexible,  there would  be little cause to  worry  about exchange rate 
arrangements. Goods markets  would  optimize relative  prices  continuously, 
including  real  exchange rates,  even if  they  had  to  cope with  nonsensical 
messages from the foreign-exchange market. Governments could then stabi- 
lize their money stocks and allow the foreign-exchange  market to determine 
nominal exchange rates, or they could peg exchange rates and allow the market 
to determine national money stocks. It is the stickiness of goods prices that 
makes the exchange rate regime important. When nominal  exchange rates 
affect  real  exchange rates,  they  also  affect  economic  activity-its  level, 
location, and composition. 
The strength of  the connection between nominal and real exchange rates is 
shown clearly in figure 2.4, which draws attention to the huge swing in real 
rates during in the 1980s. This may have been the most expensive round-trip 
in recent history, save perhaps for the swing in oil prices that began and ended 
earlier. It would have been expensive even if the effects of the strong dollar 
had  been  fully  reversed  once the  exchange rate  movement was  reversed. 
According to Branson  and Love (1 988), the appreciation  of the dollar from 
1980 to 1985 wiped out more than one million jobs in U.S. industry, affecting 
more than 5.3  percent of the work force in manufacturing. But the costs of the 
swing may prove to be even bigger because  its effects may not be reversed 
completely. 
Whole  industries  and  regions  in  the  United  States  may  be  affected 
permanently because plants that were shut down when they became uncom- 
petitive will  not be reopened. They were  not  inefficient in  1980, when the 
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exchange rate swing began, but have been rendered obsolete by decisions and 
events resulting from that swing. Export and domestic markets have been lost 
to foreign competitors, who invested heavily to capture them and will not give 
them up, even though they are less profitable than they were initially. l2 This 
is not a mercantilist dirge. It is a lament for lost resources-for  the physical 
and human capital that has been misallocated, not only in the United States but 
in other countries too. 
These real resource costs have been compounded by permanent damage to 
the  trading  system. Although  it  was  deeply  opposed  to protectionism,  the 
Reagan administration was unable to resist pressures from industries severely 
hurt  by  the appreciation  of  the  dollar. It imposed new trade  restrictions or 
tightened old ones on imports of automobiles, steel, textiles, and apparel, and 
most of  them remain in place. 
But was this trip unnecessary, or was the foreign-exchange market doing a 
job that  goods markets  could not  do because  goods prices  are not  flexible 
enough? That is the key question. 
Krugman  (1989) dismisses  the  question  curtly,  saying that  there was  no 
fundamental reason for raising the  real  value of  the dollar  in  1984 only to 
reduce  it  in  1985. He argues  persuasively  that  this  part  of  the  round-trip 
reflected irrational behavior by the foreign-exchange market. But it is hard to 
blame the whole round-trip on that sort of  behavior. The appreciation of the 
dollar began with the tightening of U.S.  monetary policy in 1979. It was driven 
thereafter by the capital inflow induced by the combination of tight money with 
a growing budget deficit. In this simple but meaningful sense, the first part of 
the trip was unavoidable  under a floating exchange rate. 
Suppose that Louvre Accord had been in force at the start of the 1980s.  What 
would have happened to the dollar? A number of economists have played back 
this period using different policies or policy rules and a different exchange rate 
regime (see, e.g., Currie and Wren-Lewis 1988, Williamson and Miller 1987, 
and  Frenkel, Goldstein, and  Masson,  ch.  1 in  this  volume). All  of  them 
conclude  that  the  world  would  have  been  a better  place.  But  most  of  the 
improvement can be traced to the modification  of U.S. policies,  not to the 
modification of the exchange rate regime. In fact, the exchange rate rules used 
in most such exercises are too loose to have much influence. The point at issue, 
moreover,  has to do with the behavior of exchange rates under the policies 
actually followed rather than the modification of those policies. There are two 
reasons. First, it is hard to believe that the Reagan administration would have 
forsworn its  idiosyncratic  fiscal experiment  in  deference  to policy  rules or 
guidelines endorsed by an earlier administration. Second, and more generally, 
it  is  wrong  to contrast  the  existing  exchange  rate  regime  under  imperfect 
policies with an alternative regime under perfect policies. 
If the G-7 governments had been committed to exchange rate management 
at the start of the  1980s, the new U.S. policy mix would have forced them to 
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put strong upward pressure on the U.S. money supply and strong downward 
pressure on other countries’ money supplies.  l3 These monetary side effects of 
exchange rate stabilization would have produced political pressures that might 
perhaps have forced the U.S.  government to act earlier and more decisively on 
the budgetary front. At the same time, the G-7 governments would have been 
warned of the need to adjust exchange rates-to  revalue the dollar gradually 
in small steps, but by less than it rose in fact under the influence of market 
forces. 
How,  then,  should  we apportion blame  for the whole  round-trip? Some 
blame must be borne by U.S. policies, which would have caused the dollar to 
appreciate significantly whether exchange rates were floating freely or closely 
managed. But much blame must be borne by the foreign-exchange market, not 
just for producing  the speculative  bubble of  1984-85  but also for taking a 
myopic view two or three years earlier. If the inhabitants of  the market had 
been endowed with the marvelous attributes displayed by those who populate 
many economists’ models, they would have known that the U.S. budget and 
trade deficits could not last indefinitely and that the dollar would have to return 
eventually  to  something  near  its  1980 level.  When  the  dollar  started  to 
appreciate, then, they  would have bet  against  it, selling dollars rather  than 
buying them and reducing the net capital inflow. In other words, they would 
have engaged  in  stabilizing speculation  on a scale sufficiently large to  keep 
nominal and real exchange rates from changing substantially. l4 
The basic lesson taught by the experience of  1980-87  has to do with the 
high cost of imperfect policies under floating exchange rates. The core of the 
case for exchange rate management is the simple but sad fact that policies and 
markets are usually imperfect and interact in costly ways under freely floating 
rates. 
2.4  Obstacles to Policy Coordination 
Economists  have  used  the policy-optimizing  framework  to measure  the 
potential gains from policy coordination. An early attempt by Oudiz and Sachs 
(1984) found  that  the  gains  were  disappointingly  small.  In  one  of  their 
exercises, for example, the coordination  of  fiscal and monetary policies  by 
Germany, Japan, and the United States had very little influence on the fiscal 
instruments and rather small effects on economic performance; when measured 
in units equivalent to percentage  point  changes in real income, the welfare 
gains  were  smaller  than  1  percent  of  GNP.  But  subsequent  studies  have 
produced bigger numbers. Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1987) have reported 
welfare gains, measured in income-equivalent units, as large as 6 or 7 percent 
of GNP and not smaller than 3 or 4 percent, depending on the model used. 
There would thus seem to be large unexploited gains from policy-optimizing 
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Why don’t governments exploit those gains? Four reasons are commonly 
given. First, governments are apt to renege on their bargains and cannot trust 
each other. Second, governments subscribe to different views about economic 
behavior and the workings of the world economy. Third, governments have 
different policy targets.  Fourth, political and constitutional  constraints inter- 
fere with the bargaining process. 
The first explanation has been demolished. The rest make sense. But they 
seem more cogent when they are invoked to explain the apparent scarcity of 
regime-preserving  coordination  than  when  they  are used  to account for a 
shortage of  policy-optimizing  coordination. 
2.4.1  Reneging and Reliability 
The concern about reneging derives in large part from the stylized way in 
which economists have represented public and private decision-making and the 
resulting concern with the problem of time consistency. The issue is illustrated 
neatly by the Barro-Gordon (1983) model, in which wages and prices are set 
by the private sector in light of its expectations concerning the inflation rate, 
which depends in turn on its expectations concerning the money supply. If the 
government promises  to raise the money supply by,  say, 5 percent  and the 
private sector expects the government to keep its word, wages and prices will 
rise immediately  by 5 percent, in line with the expected growth rate of the 
money supply. At this point, the government has two options. If it keeps its 
promise, it will exactly validate the actual inflation rate, and there will be no 
change in output or employment. If it breaks its promise and raises the money 
supply by, say, 10 percent, it will stimulate output and employment, because 
the inflation rate cannot change until wages and prices can be adjusted. If it 
breaks its word frequently, however, it will lose credibility. The private sector 
will cease to pay attention to the government’s promises; it will start to base 
its expectations on the actual growth rate of the money supply, not the rate that 
the government keeps promising. The inflation rate will rise, and the rapid 
growth  rate  of  the  money  supply  will  serve merely  to validate  the higher 
inflation rate. It will no longer stimulate output and employment.15 
The argument, however,  depends on three  assumptions: (1) the private 
sector makes binding decisions about wages and prices; (2)  the government can 
and should make promises about its own behavior to facilitate planning by the 
private  sector; and (3) the “game”  played by the government vis-a-vis the 
private sector is the only game in town. 
The assumption about binding private sector decisions is unexceptional. In 
fact, the resulting stickiness of wages and prices is one basic reason for wanting 
to stabilize  nominal  exchange rates.  The case for predictable  behavior  by 
governments is equally hard to challenge in principle but has to be qualified 
carefully.  Governments  may  need  to keep  markets  guessing  by  creating 
uncertainty  about their tactics; they need short-term flexibility,  which is not 82  Peter B. Kenen 
necessarily incompatible with medium-term predictability. Furthermore, govern- 
ments cannot be rigidly predictable in an uncertain world. If they were the only 
source of  uncertainty facing the private sector, governments could produce eco- 
nomic stability by being perfectly predictable. When governments and the private 
sector are both plagued by uncertainties, the rigid pursuit of predictable policies 
can cause instability.  l6 But the third feature of the Barro-Gordon (1983) model is 
far too restrictive. Governments play many games simultaneously, including the 
all-important political game. If a government cheats on any other player, all of them 
can punish it. In fact, they can choose a new government at the next election. In 
the international context, moreover, governments can commit themselves rather 
firmly because the costs of cheating are very high. A government that breaks its 
promises to other governments cannot make more bargains with them. This con- 
sideration is particularly important for the major industrial countries, which have 
to cooperate not only in macroeconomic matters but in many economic, political, 
and strategic domains. l7 
Governments try to refrain from making commitments they cannot expect 
to honor and try to honor those they make: 
If we take seriously the claim that policy-makers  in an anarchic world are 
constantly  tempted  to cheat, certain features of the [ 19781 Bonn  story- 
certain things that did not happen-seem  quite anomalous. We  find little 
evidence that the negotiations  were hampered by mutual fear of reneging. 
For  example,  even  though  the  Bonn  agreement  was  negotiated  with 
exquisite care, it contained no special provisions about phasing or partial 
conditionality  that  might  have  protected  the  parties  from  unexpected 
defection.  Moreover,  the  Germans  and  the  Japanese  both  irretrievably 
enacted their parts of the bargain in September [  19781, more than six months 
before [President  Carter’s] action on oil price decontrol and nearly two years 
before decontrol was implemented. 
Once the Germans and Japanese had fulfilled their parts of the bargain, 
the temptation to the President to renege should have been overpowering, 
if the standard account of international anarchy is to be believed. Moreover, 
the domestic political pressure on him to renege was clearly very strong. But 
virtually no one on either side of the final decontrol debate dismissed the 
Bonn pledge as irrelevant.  (Putnam and Henning  1986, 100) 
But these results seem natural enough when we treat the Bonn bargain as an 
exercise in regime-preserving coordination and bear in mind the complex and 
continuing relationships among the participating governments. Each stood to 
gain from its own “concessions”  as well as those of its partners, and each was 
concerned to preserve its reputation for reliability. In President Carter’s own 
words, “Each of us has been careful not to promise more than he can deliver” 
(Putnam and Henning  1986, 100). 
2.4.2  Disagreements  about Economic Behavior 
Governments do disagree about economic behavior. German and American 
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ment to aggregate demand  and even about the  way  that aggregate demand 
responds to fiscal and monetary policies. For a time, moreover, U.S. officials 
denied that there was any connection between the American budget and trade 
deficits,  while  other  governments  connected  them  simplistically,  without 
leaving  enough  room  for  the  role  of  the  exchange rate.I8 But  economists 
disagree in turn about the way that disagreements among governments affect 
policy coordination. 
Frankel  and Rockett (1988) have tried to show that misperceptions about 
economic behavior can lead to welfare-worsening policy bargains. They use 
ten  large multicountry  models to represent U.S. and European  views about 
economic behavior and assume that each party uses its own model to measure 
the welfare effects of striking a bargain with the other. The governments do 
not exchange information.  Instead, they engage in policy barter, agreeing to 
coordinate their policies whenever each government’s own calculations lead 
it  to believe  that coordination  will  be beneficial,  given  its own model  and 
objectives. 
After they have taken the governments through the bargaining process and 
know the new settings of the policy instruments, Frankel and Rockett ask what 
will happen to each country, using the “true”  model of  the world economy. 
Because they must measure the effects of every bargain using all ten models, 
they must analyze 100 potential bargains and 1,000 possible outcomes. They 
find that the United States gains in 494 cases, loses in 398, and is unaffected 
in the remaining  108, while Europe gains in 477 cases, loses in 418, and is 
unaffected in the remaining  105. The parties’  “success rates”  are about 60 
percent. 
These  are  interesting  results,  but  they  must  be  interpreted  cautiously. 
Frankel  (1988,  27)  himself  concludes  that  “ministers  in  Group of  7  and 
Summit meetings might do better to discuss their beliefs directly rather than 
telling the others how to adjust their policies.”  But that is what governments 
have been doing all along, and there is a simple way to represent the outcome. 
Suppose as before  that each government  believes  in one model  and also 
knows the other’s model. If it is not perfectly confident about the rightness of 
its views, prudential considerations should lead it to ask how a policy bargain 
would affect its welfare on the working supposition that the other government 
is using the right model; it should not strike a bargain unless it can expect to 
gain under both  governments’ models.  If  it wants to persuade its partner to 
accept its own proposals, an important part of the actual bargaining process, 
reputational considerations should lead it to make sure that its own proposals 
would  raise  its  partner’s  welfare  under  both  governments’  models.  These 
concerns, taken together, impose a strong condition on the bargaining process. 
It should not even start unless both governments can expect to gain under both 
governments’ models. 
Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1987) came to this conclusion by a different 
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They used  six models, not  ten, and had  thus to analyze thirty-six  possible 
bargains. l9 But they ruled out twenty of those bargains because they violated 
the strong condition. (Three were ruled out because Europe would be worse 
off on the U.S. view of  the world, eight because the United States would be 
worse off on the European view, and the other nine because both sides would 
be  worse  off  on the other’s  view.)  This leads  me to my  first  conclusion: 
disagreements  about economic behavior can be a major obstacle  to  policy- 
optimizing coordination. They can keep governments from getting together. 
But Holtham and Hughes Hallett went on to measure the welfare effects of the 
other sixteen bargains and found that the success rate was quite high.  It was 
73 percent for the United States and 83 percent for Europe.20  This leads to my 
second  conclusion:  when  prudential  and  reputational  considerations  block 
bargains that should not take place, policy coordination is not very dangerous 
to the participants’  health. 
It  would  be  hard  to  conduct  this  sort  of  exercise  for  an  instance  of 
regime-preserving  coordination.  But  one  would  expect  the  same  sort  of 
result.  When  governments  disagree  about  the  workings  of  the  world 
economy, they  are bound  to hold different  views  about the costs of  policy 
coordination, even when they agree completely  about the benefits.  Suppose 
that  two governments are considering  the  use  of  interest  rate  policies  for 
exchange rate stabilization.  If  they hold  different  views about the  way that 
interest rates affect aggregate demand, they will also disagree about the costs 
of exchange rate stabilization. 
Disagreements about economic behavior may be very potent in blocking this 
sort of coordination. When governments are willing to contemplate policy- 
optimizing coordination, it must be because they believe that a suitable policy 
bargain  will  allow  them  to  make welfare-improving  changes in  their  own 
national  policies.  When  thcy  are  made  to contemplate regime-preserving 
coordination, they may still believe that their national policies continue to be 
optimal and will thus want their partners to make the policy changes required 
for the common good. 
2.4.3  Disagreements  about Policy Objectives 
The  same  possibility  arises  when  governments  have  different  policy 
objectives-the  third in the list of reasons for the scarcity of coordination. In 
fact,  such differences  cannot explain  why  governments fail  to  engage  in 
policy-optimizing coordination. On the contrary, they make it more attractive. 
An cxample drawn from Eichengreen (1985) illustrates this point.  Indeed, 
it makes a stronger point. Governments that have incompatible objectives can 
nevertheless  benefit from policy-optimizing  coordination. 
Consider two identical economies with rigid wage rates and greedy govern- 
ments.  Each  government wants  to hold  three-quarters of  the  global  gold 
stock. If  they pursue  their targets  independently,  raising  their  interest  rates 
competitively  to attract  capital  inflows  and  gold, they  will  wind  up  with 
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with this outcome. The two governments can agree to reduce their interest rates 
without even talking about their targets. That is the sort of policy barter that 
many  economists  have  in  mind  when  they  talk  about  policy-optimizing 
coordination.  Alternatively,  the  governments  can  reveal  and  modify  their 
policy targets. But what if they reveal them and refuse to modify them? That 
is when conflicts or differences in targets obstruct coordination. 
This case is too simple to take seriously-or  is it‘?  It does not differ from 
the case in which governments pursue incompatible current account targets, 
and they seem to do that frequently. It does not differ from the case in which 
they  attach different  weights to different  targets,  including the common  or 
collective targets that they  can achieve only at some cost in  terms of their 
domestic targets. When collective targets are at issue, moreover, debates about 
objectives are unavoidable. The aims of the exercise have to be identified, and 
differences in preferences are bound to surface. When governments engage in 
policy barter, they can agree on means without discussing ends. When they 
engage in mutual persuasion-which  is what normally happens-it  is hard to 
agree on means without agreeing on ends. 
2.4.4  Political  and Constitutional Constraints 
The fourth reason for the shortage of coordination applies to both varieties. 
Once again, however, it provides a more compelling explanation for the scarcity 
of  regime-preserving coordination.  There are political  and constitutional ob- 
stacles to every sort of international cooperation,  but they are hardest to sur- 
mount when the costs are clear and close to home and the benefits are not. 
The political obstacles to policy coordination have been dramatized by the 
budgetary problems of  the United States. How can the United States engage 
in international bargaining about fiscal policies when congressional leaders can 
say that the president’s budget is “dead on arrival”  on Capitol Hill? In the last 
days of  World War I, the German general staff was said to believe that the 
situation was serious but not hopeless, while the Austrian general staff thought 
that  it  was  hopeless  but  not  serious.  The  Viennese  view  may  be  more 
appropriate  here.  The budgetary  deadlock  of  the  1980s does  not  signify 
permanent paralysis.  Nor should we neglect the political problems faced by 
other major countries in making and adjusting fiscal policies: 
The political system in Japan has traditionally restrained the powers of the 
Prime Minister to a far greater degree than the U.S. constitution limits the 
power of  the American President.  Always conscious of  factional politics, 
the  Prime Minister must answer to  “policy tribes”  which are groups of 
politicians  committed  to  one-dimensional  special  interests.  The  Prime 
Minister must also placate vast armies of  bureaucrats,  not always from a 
position of strength. In Japan, it has often been said, politicians reign, but 
bureaucrats rule. (Funabashi  1988, 91) 
The German situation is similar for different reasons: 
Although  the  ruling  coalition  has  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  sufficient 
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control over fiscal policy is undermined by the following two factors. First, 
since the 1970s . . . the SPD has received control of the Ministry of Finance, 
while the FDP has staffed the Ministry of  Economics, an arrangement that 
has weakened the federal government’s ability to undertake comprehensive 
or drastic measures.  Second, the federal government controls less than 50 
percent of public investment, and only about 15 percent of the nation’s total 
public spending and investment, the remainder coming from the land and 
local governments. (Funabashi  1988, 117) 
There is, of course, a fundamental difference between these situations and the 
U.S. situation. Once the German and Japanese governments have decided to 
make a policy change, they can commit themselves formally,  and the U.S. 
government cannot, because it cannot commit the Congress. But the record is 
not so very bad. President Carter was careful not to promise more than he could 
deliver-and  he did  deliver  eventually.  In another context,  moreover,  the 
White House obtained in advance a promise of  rapid congressional action on 
the trade policy bargain produced by the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations- 
the  “fast  track”  that Congress would follow in agreeing to accept or reject 
those parts of the bargain requiring new legislation. The Bush administration 
should  perhaps propose  a  similar standby  arrangement  in  the  fiscal policy 
package it takes to Capitol Hill to break the budgetary deadlock. 
The basic  problems  are political,  not  constitutional.  No democratic  gov- 
ernment can make major policy changes without working hard to persuade the 
public that the new policies will be better than the old, if not indeed the best 
of all possible policies.  When the time comes to coordinate policies, “Each 
national  leader  already  has  made  a  substantial  investment  in  building  a 
particular coalition at the domestic [game] board, and he or she will be loath 
to construct a different coalition simply to sustain an alternative policy mix that 
might be more acceptable internationally”  (Putnam and Bayne  1987, 11). In 
brief, fiscal policies are not very flexible in any democracy, regardless of its 
constitution. 
Policy coordination is made more difficult by jurisdictional divisions within 
governments. The problem is most serious on the monetary side, especially in 
Germany and the United States which have independent central banks. Here 
again, however, constitutional arrangements matter less than political realities, 
and independent central banks maintain their independence by being extremely 
astute politically. They cannot permit politicians to precommit them or to take 
their consent for granted, and they can be expected to make their views known, 
privately or publicly. Once they have given their consent, however, they are 
apt to be very reliable  partners, because  credibility  is their most important 
asset. Furthermore, they rely on each other to protect their independence. On 
a number of recent occasions, central banks have refused to make interest rate 
changes until they could be sure that foreign central banks were ready to move 
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Finally, monetary policies can be altered rapidly and incrementally, without 
building a new political consensus. That is why a change in monetary policy 
is usually the first signal of a change in official thinking about the economic 
outlook. Therefore, monetary  policies  can be coordinated  more deftly  than 
fiscal policies, despite jurisdictional divisions in some countries. 
2.5  The Framework for Policy Coordination 
Rigidities in making fiscal policies and differences of view about the ways 
in which they work are probably sufficient to account for the apparent scarcity 
of policy-optimizing coordination-why  governments fail to exploit all of the 
potential  gains.  They  may  even  account  for  a  more  important  failure. 
Quantitative studies of policy coordination have to start with a benchmark- 
the counterpart of the noncooperative equilibrium. They must therefore define 
fully optimal policies for each government acting unilaterally, and this is an 
instructive  exercise. The welfare  gains obtained by  optimizing  policies  are 
often larger than the gains obtained thereafter by moving from noncooperative 
to cooperative policies. Dealing with policy coordination between the United 
States and Europe, Hughes Hallett (1987) obtains these welfare measures: 
Simulation  United States  Europe 
Baseline  466.2  346.2 
Noncooperative  103.6  81.3 
Cooperative  96.2  55.8 
These  are  loss-function  calculations,  measuring  the  welfare  costs  of  the 
governments’ failure to reach their targets, so reductions are good things. But 
the biggest reductions occur on the way from the actual (baseline) situation to 
optimal  noncooperative policies,  not  from  noncooperative  to  cooperative 
(coordinated) policies.  Political  and institutional  rigidities combine with the 
uncertainties  of the real world to interfere with any sort of  optimization, let 
alone optimal coordination. 
The same rigidities and disagreements also help to account for the apparent 
scarcity of regime-preserving coordination, and disagreements  about targets are 
important too. They combine to produce disagreements about burden sharing. 
But disagreements of this sort are more readily susceptible to resolution than 
those which arise when one government tries to tell another how to pursue its 
own self-interest. For this reason, if no other, we can perhaps be optimistic about 
the prospects for the sorts of policy coordination required to support exchange 
rate management. 
What  sorts  of  coordination  are needed? The Williamson-Miller  (1987) 
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differences would be used to stabilize exchange rates, while the global average 
of real  interest rates and national fiscal policies  would be used  to regulate 
nominal expenditure.  Conflicts between external and internal balance would 
be reconciled in the usual way, by periodic adjustments in real exchange rates. 
This is a far more sensible assignment than the one proposed by McKinnon 
(1988),  who  believes  that  fiscal  policies  should  regulate  current  account 
balances because real exchange rates do not affect them, that the global money 
supply should be used to control the global price level, and that nonsterilized 
intervention should keep nominal exchange rates in line with purchasing power 
parity. Fiscal policies cannot control current account balances without impos- 
ing unemployment on deficit countries and inflationary pressures on surplus 
countries. They may be needed to validate changes in real exchange rates but 
cannot replace them.22 
Yet the Williamson-Miller (  1987) framework fails to address some difficult 
issues.  While monetary  policies  must  be  coordinated  closely  to  influence 
capital  flows  and  offset  expectations  of  exchange rate  realignments,  they 
cannot be assigned to that task exclusively, nor can fiscal policies be assigned 
exclusively to managing nominal  demand. On the one hand, fiscal policies 
affect current account balances and, therefore,  the size of  the task faced by 
monetary  policies.  On  the  other hand,  fiscal  policies  cannot  be  adjusted 
frequently enough to stabilize aggregate demand. Monetary policies must do 
some of the work that fiscal policies could do if they were more flexible, and 
exchange rate changes must do the rest. 
It is important to distinguish between exchange rate management and the 
rigid defense of pegged exchange rates within very narrow bands. In my own 
view, the bands should be hard but wide and should be adjusted frequently to 
rectify disequilibria, including those that result from rigid fiscal policies. It is 
also important to distinguish  between  fiscal  differences  and  fiscal  shocks. 
International  differences  in  fiscal  policies  do  not  necessarily  destabilize 
exchange rates. They have not done so in the EMS, even though they continue 
to be quite large (see Gros and Thygesen 1988, 7). In fact, differences in fiscal 
policies can compensate for differences in national savings rates that would 
otherwise produce current account imbalances. The lessons to be learned from 
the  1980s relate  to the effects  of  large  fiscal  shocks, which  are bad  news 
indeed,  and  the  framework  for  multilateral  surveillance  currently  being 
developed by the G-7 governments should focus very sharply on that problem. 
Appendix 
This appendix presents the model used to derive the results reported in the text. 
The model contains two countries, the U.S. and EC, but is written entirely in 
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with  primes  and  those  pertaining to the EC bond  (F, F',  etc.)  which  are 
denominated in EC ecu. The subscripts 1 and 2 denote U.S. and EC variables 
respectively; asterisks denote long-run values and exogenous shifts in demands 
for goods and assets. 
The U.S. Economy 
is 
U.S. households hold U.S. money, U.S. bonds, andEC  bonds. Their wealth 
(1)  Wl  = Ll + B, + TF,, 
where W,  is U.S. wealth, L,  and B,  measure U.S. holdings of U.S. money and 
bonds, F,  measures U.S. holdings of EC bonds denominated in ecu, and 7~ is 
the exchange rate in dollars per ecu. (An increase in T is a depreciation of the 
dollar.) The time path of  U.S. wealth is 
(2)  (dw,ldt) = s,  + F,(dT/dt), 
where S, is U.S. saving, and the last term measures the capital gain conferred 
by a depreciation of  the dollar. 
The U. S . money supply is 
(3)  L, = BC -  R, 
where  L, is the money  supply,  B'  is the central  bank's  holdings  of  U.S. 
bonds,  and R  measures its  reserve  liabilities  to the  EC central bank.  (An 
increase in B'  reflects an open market purchase by the U.S. central bank; an 
increase  in  R  reflects  nonsterilized  intervention  in  the  foreign-exchange 
market-a  dollar purchase by the U.S. or EC central bank to keep T from 
rising.) 
The supply of dollar bonds can change only gradually as the U.S. govern- 
ment runs a budget deficit  or surplus. The market-clearing  equation for the 
U.S. bond is 
(4)  B  zz  B,  + B, + B', 
where B,  and B, are the quantities held by U.S. and EC residents and B'  is the 
quantity held by the U.S. central bank. The evolution of B is governed by a 
stylized fiscal policy: 
(5)  (dBldt) = g(B* -  B),  0 < g < 1. 
The U.  S. government  chooses a target level of debt, B*, and runs a budget deficit 
or surplus until target and actual debt levels are equal. The government cuts 
taxes to run a deficit, then rescinds the tax cut gradually to satisfy equation (5). 
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(6)  g(B* -  B)  = GI + rlB - TI - TI2 - rlBc,  TI,  = r,B, -  r@,, 
where GI  is the government's spending on U.S. and EC goods, rl and r2  are 
the  interest rates  on  U.S. and  EC bonds,  TI  is the  lump sum tax  that  the 
government adjusts continuously to run the desired surplus or deficit, and TI, 
is an intergovernmental transfer payment from the EC to the U.S. that removes 
all interest income terms from the definitions of the current account balance 
and disposable income. 
The demand for money by U.S. households is defined with reference to the 
value of U.S. output and varies inversely with the U.S. interest rate around f, 
its initial level: 
where Q, is U.S. output and pI  is its price. The demand for the EC bond by 
U.S. households is defined with reference to U.S. wealth and varies with the 
difference between U.S. and EC interest rates: 
The demand for the U.S. bond by U.S. households  is defined residually by 
equations (l), (7), and (8). 
Saving depends on the difference between desired and actual wealth: 
(9)  s,  = s(WT - Wl),  0 < s < 1 
Desired  wealth, in  turn, depends on the domestic interest  rate  and on dis- 
posable income: 
The term sa is the marginal propensity to save out of disposable income (and 
must thus lie between zero and unity); the restriction on 8,  puts a lower bound 
on capital mobility.  Disposable income is 
(11)  Y;'  = plQl + r,B, + r,rF,  - TI = plQl - GI + g(B* -  B), 
where equation (6) has been used to replace the lump sum tax T,. 
Households and the government have identical preferences  with regard to 
goods, and u, measures  the share of  the  EC good in total  U.S.  spending. 
Therefore. 
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Finally, the market-clearing equation for the U.S. good is 
where c,~  is the quantity of the U.S.  good imported by the EC for household 
and government consumption. 
The EC Economy 
It is not necessary to write out all of the EC equations, since they resemble 
their U.S. counterparts. The equations for EC wealth, however, look different 
because they are written in terms of the dollar (the foreign currency) rather than 
the ecu: 
where W2  is EC wealth, L; and F2 measure holdings of EC money and bonds 
in ecu, B2  measures holdings of U.S.  bonds in dollars, and S,  is EC saving in 
dollars. The supplies of the two ecu assets are given by 
(3') 
(4') 
L; = Fc + (l/n)R, 
F  = Fi + F2  + F', 
(5')  (dFldt) = g(F* -  F), 
where F, F'  and F*  play  the roles that B, B", and B*  played  in the U.S. 
equations. The EC budget equation is 
(6')  g(F* -  F)  = G;  + r2F - Ti + (1/7r)T12  - r2Fc, 
where  G;  and T; play  the roles that  GI and TI  played  in the U.S. budget 
equation. The EC demands for money and the U.S.  bond are 
The EC demand for the EC bond  is defined residually.  The remaining EC 
equations,  for  saving,  desired  wealth,  disposable  income,  levels  of  EC 
spending on  the  U.S. and  EC goods,  and  the  consumer  price  index,  are 
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subscripts. The market-clearing  equation for the EC good is made redundant 
by Walras's  Law. 
Strategic Simplifications 
Four conditions are imposed on the initial situation.  Prices are normalized 
at  unity  (p, = p; = T =  1, so that p2 = ~p;  = q, = q2 = Tq; = 1). 
Interest  rates  are equalized (r, = r2 = f).  Net reserves  are  zero (R = 0). 
Both  economies  start  in  a  stationary  state  (S, = S2 = 0, B*  = B, and 
F*  = F),  so trade is balanced  initially (pIc12  = ~2~21). 
Two  restrictions  are  imposed  on  economic  behavior.  Each  country's 
spending is biased toward its own home good, so that a, <  % and  (1 -  a,) 
< %,  where al and a2  are the shares of the EC good in U.S. and EC spending, 
espectively. When the U.S. and EC interest rates are equal, as they are to start, 
the  share  of  the  foreign-currency  asset  in  each  country's  wealth  is  equal 
to  the  share  of  the  imported  good  in  that  country's  spending,  so  that 
PI =  a,  and P2  =  (1 - a2). 
Finally, outputs and levels of government spending are the same in the U.S. 
and EC (Q, = Q2 = Q,  and GI = C;  = G), and all behavioral parameters 
are the same (6,  =  6,  =  6, and 0, =  0,  =  0).  Under theseassump- 
tions, moreover,  W,  =  W,, and a,  =  (1 - a2) =  u,  because trade is 
balanced initially. 
The model  is solved  for the short-run and long-run effects of  six distur- 
bances:  open market  purchases  of  the  domestic bond  in  the U.S.  and EC 
(dBc > 0 and dFc > 0),  a permanent shift by U.S. or EC households from the 
EC  bond  to the U.S.  bond  (dB; > 0), a  permanent  shift  in  U.S. or EC 
spending from the U.S. good to the EC good (dc; > 0),  permanent increases 
in government spending in the U.S. and EC matched by increases in lump sum 
taxes (dG,  > 0 and dG; > 0),  permanent increases in desired wealth causing 
temporary  increases  in  saving (6WT > 0 and dW:  > 0),  and temporary  tax 
cuts  in  the  U.S.  and  EC causing  permanent  increase  in  stocks  of  debt 
(dB* > 0 and dF*  > 0).  As prices are sticky in both countries, p,  and p; are 
held at unity to obtain the short-run solutions, but Q, and Q2  vary. As outputs 
return eventually to their natural levels, Q,  and Q2  are held at their initial levels 
to obtain the long-run  solutions, but p,  and  p; vary. 
The Short-Run Solutions 
The pegged rate solutions are obtained by holding T  at unity and allowing 
R to vary: 
(15)  dR  = (l/H){aW+[n(vdB"  -  vdP) - (1 - 2a)(dw, - 4)  + 2d~;] 
~  [~(l  - 2a)Wa + nQS]dB;}, 
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H  = ~(l  - 2a)J + 2a(QS + nvW+), 
n = 2a  + sail - 2a), 
J  = W8  + aQS, 
d~,  = s(adG1 -  dWT)  +  (1 -  sa)gdB*, 
dx2 = s(adG; - dW;)  +  (1 -  sa)gdF*. 
An  open  market  purchase of  domestic  bonds reduces  the  reserves  of  the 
country involved; so do  the two forms of fiscal expansion and a permanent fall 
in desired  wealth  (a temporary  decrease in household  saving).  A switch in 
demand to the U.S. bond raises U.S. reserves. A switch in demand to the EC 
good raises EC reserves. 
The changes in outputs are 
(16) dQ1  = (l/H)(l/J){[H~VdB'  + H,vdFc  + v(HI -  H,)dBT] 
+ (l/s)(M,dxl  + M&,)  -  J[(QS + 2mW+)d~: -  Hfdfi]}, 
where 
HI  = [~(l  - 2a)J + a(QS + nvW+)]W@,  H2 = u(QS + nvW+)We, 
MI  = ~(l  - 2a)J(QS + UVW+)  + uQS  (QS + nvW+), 
M2 = a[QS(QS + 2mW+) -  ~(l  - 2a)W@(vW+)], 
Hf = a[(QS + 2mW+)Uf + 2v(l -  a)Ws(l - 2a)W8], 
Uf = Q + s(l - 2a)W. 
These effects are unambiguous, with one exception noted shortly.  An open 
market purchase of  the domestic bond raises both countries' outputs but raises 
domestic output by more than foreign output (HI > H2). Both forms of fiscal 
expansion raise domestic output but can raise or lower foreign output, and a 
reduction in desired wealth has the same effects. A switch in demand to the 
U.S. bond raises U.S. output and reduces EC output, and a switch in demand 
to the EC good has the opposite effects. The final terms in equations (16)  and 
(16')  describe the effects of  a once-for-all  devaluation of  the dollar,  which 
raises U.S. output and reduces EC output. 
The floating rate solutions are obtained by holding R at zero and allowing 
Tr to vary: 
(17)  dTr  = (l/a)(A/U)dR, 
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U  = 2{(1 - a)[s(l - 2a)J + ~uQS]  + u+U~}. 
These effects are unambiguous,  because those in equation (15) were unam- 
biguous. The dollar depreciates under a floating rate whenever U.S. reserves 
would fall under a pegged rate. 
The changes in outputs are 
(18)  dQ1  = (l/U){  (I/J)[UlvdB' - U2vdFC - (l/W)JQSUfdB;] 
+ (1/J)(l/s)Q8[Vldxl  + V&J  ~  2Q6(1 - 
(18')  dQ2  = (l/U){(  l/J)[UlvdF" - U2vdB" + (I/W)JQSUfdB;] 
+ (1/J)(l/s)QS[Vldx2  + V2dxI]  + 2QS(l -  a&;}, 
where 
These terms are unambiguous  (even U2 ,  as + > 0).  An open market pur- 
chase of the domestic bond raises domestic output but reduces foreign output. 
Both forms of fiscal expansion raise both outputs, as does a permanent fall in 
desired wealth. A switch in demand to the U.S.  bond reduces U.S. output and 
raises EC output, and a switch in demand to the EC good has the same effects. 
The Long-Run Solutions 
These are the long-run solutions for the pegged rate case: 
(19)  dR = (1/2N){[(1  -  2~)W8  + 2aW+](vdBC - vdF") 
- 2(QS)dB; + QS[(l - 2a)(adGl -  dWT) 
- (1 - 2a)((~dG;  - dW;)  + (dB* - dF*)] 
+ [(l - 2aiJ + 2aW+](l/a)dc;}, 
where 
N  = ~(l  - 2~)W0  + ~uvW+  + QS. 
There is an important difference between the signs of these effects and those 
in equation (15),  pertaining to the short run. In the short run, both forms of 
fiscal expansion raise the reserves of the country involved,  and a permanent 
fall in desired wealth has the same effect; in the long run, however, they reduce 
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(20)  dql  = (1/2JQ)[WB(vdB'  + VdF')  + QS(dB* 
+ adGI -  dWT)+ QS(dF* + adG; - my;)] 
- (1/2Q)(  1 -  2~)(  l/a)dc:  + (l/2)d.fr, 
(20')  dq;  = (1/2JQ)[  . . . ] + (1/2Q)(1  -  2a)(l/~)dc:  - (1/2)dfi, 
where the term [ . . . ] in equation (20')  is identical to the corresponding term 
in equation (20).  A switch in demand to the U.S. bond has no permanent effect 
on the countries'  price levels; it does not appear in equations (20)  and (20'). 
A switch in demand to the EC good drives them apart, raising the EC price 
level and reducing the U.S. price level,  and a devaluation has the opposite 
effects, but all of the other disturbances raise them by the same amounts. 
These are the long-run solutions for the floating rate case: 
(21)  d.rr  = (2N/QK)dR, 
where dR is the vector of changes in reserves given in equation (19) and 
K  = (1 - 2u)J + 2aW(6 + +). 
The changes in the two price indexes are 
(22)  dql  = (l/JQK){K,VdB' -  K,vdFc -  QWdB: + JK&$ 
+ Q6[(l - 2a)J + aW(6 + +)](dB* + adG, - m) 
+ aQS[W(6 + +) -  J]dF* + aQSW(6 + +)(adG; - dWT)}, 
(22') dq; = (l/JQK){K,vdF' -  K2vdBc + QWdBT -  JK&T 
+ Q6[(l - 2a)J + aW(6 + +)](dF* + adG; - dW;) 
+ aQ6[W(S + 4) -  J]dB* 
+ aQ6W(6 + +)(adGI - my?)}, 
where 
K1  = We[(l -  2a)J + aW(6 + +)] + (uW+)J, 
K2 = aWEi(aQ+ - We), 
KO  = (1 -  2a)a6G + aW(6 + +). 
An open market purchase of the domestic bond raises the domestic price level 
and reduces the foreign price level (as + > 0).  A temporary tax cut causing 
a permanent increase in debt raises the domestic price level but can raise or 
lower the  foreign  price  level.  A  balanced  budget  increase  in  government 
spending raises both price levels, as does a permanent fall in desired wealth. 
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the EC price level, and a switch in demand to the EC good has the opposite 
effects. 
The Bliss-Point Shifts 
To  obtain  the countries'  bliss-point  shifts,  we  would  set  dQ, = dQ2 = 
dq, = dq;  = 0 and solve the appropriate output and price equations for the 
requisite changes in B'  and F'.  Under a pegged exchange rate, for example, 
equations (16) and (20) would be solved for the U.S. bliss-point shifts, and 
equations (16') and (20') would be solved for the EC bliss-point shifts. This 
is laborious and not really necessary. It is simpler to set dQ , = dQ2 and solve 
the appropriate output equations for the changes in B'  and F'  that stabilize Q, 
and Q2.  These will represent common bliss-point shifts if it can be shown that 
dq, = d;  = 0 when  the  changes in  B'  and  FC are  inserted  in  the  price 
equations. 
Here is the simplest illustration. With a switch in demand from the EC bond 
to  the  U.S.  bond  (dB; > 0) and  a  pegged  exchange rate,  equations  (16) 
and  (16')  say  that  dB'  = - dFc = dB;  will  stabilize  both  countries' 
outputs.  But  the  switch in  demand  does not  affect price  levels, and when 
dB'  + dFc = 0,  equations (20) and (20') say that dq, = dq;  = 0. There- 
fore, the bliss points shift together. But the changes in Bc and FC  that stabilize 
Q,  and Q2 with a floating exchange rate, obtained from equations (18) and 
(18'), do not stabilize q1  and q; when used in equations (22) and (22'). 
The  same results  obtain  with  balanced  budget  changes in  government 
spending and changes in desired wealth. They do not obtain in the remaining 
cases, with  temporary tax cuts leading to permanent changes in supplies of 
debt,  and  switches  in  demand  between  goods.  With a  U.S.  tax  cut,  for 
example, outputs are stabilized with a pegged exchange rate when 
dBC  = - (l/v)(  l/WO)(QS + a~Wc$)(  l/s)(  1 - sa)gdB*, 
dFc = (l/v)(  l/WO)(avWc$)(  l/s)(  1 - sa)gdB*. 
But these solutions give dq, = dq; = -  (1/2)S(l/s)[(l -  sa)g -  s]dB*, which 
goes to zero when g  = s/(l - sa)  but not otherwise. 
Notes 
1. Corden  examines  these  issues  in  a  subsequent  paper  (Corden  1986), paying 
particular  attention to the interdependence of  fiscal policies.  He concedes that large 
countries'  budget deficits can have large effects on  real exchange rates and interest 
rates. But he does not depart substantially from his earlier conclusion.  Governments 
should mitigate the adverse effects of their neighbors' policies by making compensatory 
changes in their own domestic policies rather than rely on agreed rules or procedures 
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2. In earlier papers (Kenen  1987a, 1987b, 1988b), I used different names for the 
approaches described in this and the next paragraph, but each attempt to label them ran 
into difficulties. 
3. Similar definitions are used by Bryant (1980,465), Artis and Ostry (1986,75) and 
Frankel (1988, 1). The varieties of cooperation are discussed in Kenen (1987a). Some 
authors  are  less  emphatic  about  including  commitments  about  instruments  in  the 
definition of coordination. But the concept becomes too elastic without them. At the 
start of the 198Os, governments firmly agreed to combat inflation but said nothing about 
the settings of their monetary and fiscal policies, and the outcome was unsatisfactory- 
huge movements in real exchange rates and in current account balances. No one would 
want to identify that outcome with policy coordination. In fact, the subsequent revival 
of full-fledged coordination was partly a reaction to that outcome. 
4. Describing the negotiations that led to the Louvre Accord, Funabashi (1988, chs. 
5-8)  depicts  it  differently:  Japan  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  agreed 
reluctantly to take new fiscal measures in exchange for a commitment by the United 
States to help  stabilize dollar exchange rates  by  joint  intervention.  There were no 
commitments about monetary policies.  This characterization is not wholly accurate. 
The United States was also pressed to make fiscal policy commitments,  and it had 
agreed to the  stabilization of  the yen-dollar exchange rate some months before the 
Louvre Accord (even before Japan agreed to take new fiscal measures). Furthermore, 
the disagreement about German interest rates that cropped up in October  1987, the 
“collapse”  of coordination to which Feldstein refers, suggests that the Louvre Accord 
included understandings  about  interest rate policies,  even  if  there  were no formal 
undertakings. 
5. The most recent version of Meade’s proposal, developed in Blake, Vines, and 
Weale (1988),  is  even  more  comprehensive  than  the  Williamson-Miller  proposal, 
having a wealth target as well as a GDP target, and it uses a different rule to define the 
exchange rate target. 
6. Following Hamada (1974, 1976), the Nash and Pareto equilibria are usually de- 
picted by  reaction curves, as in figure 2.3. These curves appear to say that govern- 
ments respond directly to changes in other governments’ policies. If that were true, 
however, the Nash equilibrium would degenerate; each government would soon notice 
that other governments do not stand pat when it alters its own policies.  Therefore, 
reaction curves should be deemed to say that governments respond to the efsects of their 
partners’ policies. They can then react repeatedly to each others’ policies without be- 
coming aware of policy interdependence. For surveys of research on policy-optimizing 
coordination, see Cooper (1985), Kenen (1987a), and Fischer (1988); on recent the- 
oretical developments, see Oudiz and Sachs (1985). 
7. Cooper (1985) and Kindleberger (1  986) are prominent among the economists;  for the 
views of political scientists and policymakers, see Putnam and Bayne (1987, ch.  I), and 
the sources cited there. Paul Krugman has persuaded me that the policy-optimizing frame- 
work can be used to represent  regime-preserving coordination by including the international 
public good in the governments’ welfare functions. That, indeed, is done in some recent 
papers; a measure of exchange rate variability is included in the governments’ loss functions 
to represent their collective interest in exchange rate stability. I still believe, however, that 
the regime-preserving approach is sufficiently  different in its implications to justify the sharp 
distinction drawn in this paper. 
8.  It is still necessary to decide what should be done with one country’s money supply 
or with the global money supply. In many representations of pegged rate regimes, that 
decision is left to a single country (the United States in the Bretton Woods system and 
Germany in the EMS); McKinnon (1984) would handle the problem collectively, as 
would  Williamson  and Miller  (1987), who would use  the global money supply to 
manage the average short-term interest rate (see fig. 2.1). This is the fundamental issue 98  Peter B. Kenen 
facing the designers of a European central bank. The question of substitutability, central 
to the functioning of policy coordination under pegged exchange rates, is also central 
to the functioning of official intervention in foreign-exchange markets; see Marston, ch. 
6 in this volume. 
9. Other economists have suggested or used the same basic approach. Buiter and 
Eaton (1985) show that Nash and Pareto equilibria are both bliss-point equilibria when 
policy targets and instruments are equal in number; Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986) 
anticipate my approach to the ranking of exchange rate regimes but do not carry it out; 
Tumovsky and d’Orey (1986) adopt the same strategy but deal only with temporary 
disturbances. 
10. The size of the bliss-point shift does not depend on the particular shape of the 
ellipse in figure 2.2 (on the preferences of the U.S.  government); it depends only on 
the slopes of the BB and FF curves (on the structures of the U.S.  and EC economies). 
11. See, for example,  Dominguez  (1986), Frankel and Froot  (1986, 1987), and 
Krugman (1989); recent research on this issue is surveyed by Dornbusch and Frankel 
(1987). 
12. This theme is developed by Krugman (1989), drawing partly on work by Dixit 
(1989) concerning the effects of uncertainty about the future exchange rate. A firm that 
has made the investment required to enter a market may decide to remain in that market 
even when the exchange rate turns against it, even though it cannot cover its variable 
costs, if  the firm is sufficiently uncertain about the permanence of the new exchange 
rate. Conversely, a firm that has left a market may decide not to make the investment 
required to reenter  it  when  the exchange  rate moves in its favor. For more on the 
allocational effects of the exchange rate swing, see Marris (1987, 54-60). 
13. These  tendencies  would  have  developed  even  under  existing  institutional 
arrangements, which automatically sterilize the effects of foreign official intervention 
on the U.S. money supply (and likewise sterilize the effects of U.S. intervention when 
conducted by the U.S. Treasury rather than the Federal Reserve); see Kenen (1988a, 
ch. 5).  To prevent the dollar from appreciating, foreign official institutions would have 
been forced to sell dollars and thus to sell the U.S. government securities in which they 
invest their dollar reserves. To prevent U.S. interest rates from rising sharply under the 
influence of those sales and thus enlarging the capital inflow to the United States, the 
Federal  Reserve  System  would  have  been  compelled  to  undertake  open  market 
purchases  of  government  securities, and these  would have raised  the  U.S.  money 
supply. Furthermore,  foreign central  banks  could  not  have sterilized  the  domestic 
money-supply effects of their own and U.S. intervention without reducing their interest 
rates and thus enlarging  the  capital flow. These monetary effects of  exchange rate 
management  have  also  been  cited  by  Frenkel  (1987)  and  Dornbusch  (1988)  in 
criticizing McKinnon’s rules for exchange rate management and by  Williamson and 
Miller (1987) in defending their own proposals from those, like myself, who favor 
tighter arrangements. 
14. In this case, however, the current account deficit would have been smaller, and 
interest rates might have risen in the United States, in order to crowd out domestic 
investment and thus make room for the budget deficit. 
15. Taken to its  logical  conclusion,  the  Barro-Gordon  model  restates  the  basic 
proposition of the  “new”  macroeconomics-that  monetary policy cannot affect the 
real  economy-but  casts  it  as  a  long-run  tendency.  If  a  government  protects  its 
reputation by keeping its promises, it can never alter output or employment. If  it risks 
its reputation by breaking its word, it will vitiate its ability to surprise the private sector. 
Rogoff (1985) uses the same basic model to show why international policy coordination 
can be welfare-worsening, but his results have been challenged by Currie, Levine, and 
Vidalis (1987) and by Carraro and Giavazzi (1988). 99  Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies 
16. Bryant (1987) has made the same point and applied it  more generally to the 
problems of time consistency and reneging. He points out that all policy promises are 
contingent  on  forecasts  about  the  state of  the  world,  explicitly  or implicitly.  It  is 
therefore impossible for anyone to know whether a government is reneging on previous 
promises or adapting to new circumstances. 
17.  These  considerations  are  finding  their  way  into  the  formal  literature  on 
policy-optimizing coordination; see Canzoneri and Henderson ( 1987). But the empha- 
sis is still too narrow; it treats policy coordination as a repeated game but neglects the 
broad context in which the game is played. 
18. Some of these disagreements  may really testify to disputes about objectives. It may 
be more convenient for governments to say “That won’t work” than to say “We don’t like 
that.” If this is true, however, apparent disagreements about behavior should not interfere 
with policy-optimizing coordination because disagreements about objectives can actually 
enhance the gains from that sort of  coordination. An illustration follows shortly. 
19.Holtham and Hughes Hallett used an early version of the Frankel-Rockett paper, 
which gave complete results  for six models.  The final version  of  the paper  shows 
results  that  differ appreciably  from  those  in the  early  version  but  gives  complete 
results  for only  four  models.  It  is therefore  impossible  to  update  the  calculations 
reported in the text. (When they are updated for the four models shown in tables 4 and 
5 of the final version, seven of the sixteen bargains violate the strong condition, and 
the success rates for the remaining nine approach 75 percent, up from 69 percent for 
all twenty-four bargains.) 
20.  These  numbers  cannot  be compared  directly  to  the  60  percent  success  rate 
reported by Frankel and Rockett, which covered all ten models. The corresponding rate 
for the six models used by  Holtham and Hughes Hallett was 62 percent. 
21. See Funabashi (1988, chs. 2 and 7). But his assessment of monetary cooperation 
is more critical than mine. He seems to regard the central bankers’ silence at certain 
G-5 meetings as reflecting a reluctance to coordinate their policies. It should perhaps 
be seen as reflecting their reluctance to endorse the rather ambitious commitments made 
by  finance ministers. 
22.  See  Dornbusch  (1988)  and  Krugman  (1989).  Simulations  by  Currie  and 
Wren-Lewis (1988) support this view; feedback rules based on the Williamson-Miller 
framework  do better  than rules that  use  fiscal policies  to  regulate current  account 
balances and monetary policies to regulate aggregate demand. 
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Comment  Richard N. Cooper 
The Bretton Woods system can be said to have begun de facto in 1959, when 
West European currencies first became fully convertible for current account 
transactions.  Before  a  decade  had  passed  it  was  under  severe  pressure, 
accompanied  by  widespread  calls  within  the  economics  profession  for  its 
abandonment in favor of some form of flexible exchange rates.  Over fifteen 
years after the inauguration of widespread exchange rate flexibility, in March 
1973, there are increasing calls within the economics profession for some form 
of exchange rate management. Although many economists still favor relatively 
unmanaged  floating,  the weight of  argument  and evidence is shifting away 
from the conditions that must be met for free floating to be optimal, or even 
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superior, to extensive official management of exchange rates, if not outright 
rigidity. 
Peter Kenen has added to the weight of argument. In a simple portfolio- 
balance model in which assets are imperfect substitutes, Kenen finds that, for 
three of the five generic disturbances he examines, fixed exchange rates permit 
national policymakers to achieve their objectives on their own, without formal 
coordination among countries, whereas freely floating exchange rates do not. 
For the other two generic  disturbances, neither  fixed nor floating exchange 
rates lead to such a result; some coordination  of policy among countries will 
lead  to  an  outcome  superior  to  that  arising  from  decentralized  national 
decision-making.  Kenen’s  results  thus  scotch  the  notion,  once  prevalent 
among economists, that freely floating exchange rates will generally insulate 
countries from international influences, especially those arising in the financial 
sector. 
Kenen provides  a thoughtful  review of the recent literature on policy  co- 
ordination among countries, as well as adding to it, and offers his judgements, 
with which I generally agree, on a number of points in that literature.  First, 
exchange rate cooperation in the late 1980s among the major countries is not 
best interpreted in terms of most academic literature on coordination, since that 
literature typically assumes a policy-optimizing framework for analysis; rather, 
it should be interpreted in terms of what Kenen calls regime-preservation. Two 
relevant aspects to those cooperative efforts, not emphasized by Kenen, were 
the desire in 1985 to push the dollar down sharply in order to protect the liberal 
trading  system by reducing  protectionist pressures in the United  States, and 
the desire in  1987 to reestablish  some  stability  in  exchange rates  on  the 
grounds that  significant movements in exchange rates can themselves be a 
source  of  disturbance to national  economies,  what  Kenen calls  the public 
goods aspect of exchange rate stability.  (It must be said, however,  that the 
Louvre Accord of I987 resulted in part from Japanese concern that a further 
sharp rise in the yen  from the late 1986 level would  put severe adjustment 
strains  on  Japanese  firms,  and  an  American  concern  that  further  sharp 
depreciation of the dollar would revive inflationary expectations in the United 
States,  both  notions  that  could  be  encompassed  in  a  policy-optimizing 
framework.) 
Second, the  widely  cited  Frankel-Rockett  (1988) simulations on policy 
coordination  under  different  perceived  models  of  how  economies  work 
exaggerate the risks of policy coordination, since those results do not allow for 
acknowledgement by policymakers that their preferred model might be wrong. 
The caution that is appropriate to uncertain knowledge would reduce substan- 
tially the number of instances in which policymakers would coordinate policies 
to their own ultimate disadvantage. 
Third, the preoccupation  in the technical literature with so-called time in- 
consistency, or the likelihood that governments will renege on commitments 
previously made, while interesting from a technical point of view, is misplaced. 104  Peter B. Kenen 
Governments at any time are playing many  “games”  and expect to continue 
doing so in the future. To renege on clear past commitments would compro- 
mise their positions  in other current and subsequent negotiations.  They thus 
have ample reason-to  preserve  credibility-for  keeping their past commit- 
ments unless there are plausible and well-understood reasons for not doing so. 
Fourth, disagreements on objectives are probably not a significant obstacle 
to macroeconomic  cooperation  among major market-oriented  economies; in- 
deed, disagreements on certain kinds of objectives (e.g., current account tar- 
gets) may substantially enhance the gains from cooperation. Rather, disagree- 
ments on the behavioral responses of economies to specified policy actions are 
a much more serious obstacle to coordination of macroeconomic policies,  as 
indeed was also the case for international cooperation in preventing the spread 
of  contagious diseases until scientific developments resulted in consensus on 
the etiologies of  the important diseases (Cooper 1989). 
Kenen’s paper does not focus on the debate over the exchange rate regime, 
but his analysis raises new questions about the desirability of free floating. I 
would  like  to take  the occasion to go further and  reopen  an  old  but  still 
unsettled question concerning the use of nominal exchange rates as either a free 
endogenous variable in the economy or as a policy tool. 
That is perhaps best done by posing an operational  question:  would  it be 
desirable  to depreciate  the North  German mark  against  the  South German 
mark? Or should the New England dollar be appreciated  against other U.S. 
dollars? Each of these actions had something to be said for it in 1987 and early 
1988. North Germany was relatively  depressed, while  South Germany was 
buoyant, yet wages were determined at the national level so that North German 
wages were too high relative to South German wages. A depreciation of  the 
North German mark could possibly correct for this and stimulate economic 
activity in the north, while dampening it somewhat in the south. 
Similarly, New England in 1987-88  was booming, with house prices and 
other prices of nontradables rising especially rapidly. The oil and gas regions 
of  the  U.S. economy  and  to  a  lesser  extent the  industrial  midwest  were 
somewhat depressed. Appreciating the New England dollar against other U.S. 
dollars, and in particular against the Texas dollar, would redistribute economic 
activity in a desirable direction. 
Since these actions would be generally desirable, why do we not think about 
them? The answer probably lies in their total political impractability. They run 
strongly against the national unity that a unified currency area both fosters and 
symbolizes, and which the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States 
of America have each established. The proposals are simply too radical, even 
quixotic. 
But  I  suggest  there  is another,  more analytical  reason  for not  seriously 
thinking  about  these  changes  in  exchange rates.  To  depreciate the  North 
German mark  against  the South German mark, or to  appreciate the Boston 
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country badly. It would create a major new source of uncertainty  in making 
contracts and in investing on the basis of future expected demand. Business- 
men must worry about the real value of money, but the rate of inflation changes 
slowly compared with real exchange rates under a system of flexible exchange 
rates.  Movements in exchange rates can wipe out-or  double-a  5 percent 
profit margin in a week. Movements in nominal exchange rates, which as we 
have learned in recent years do more than simply correct for differential rates 
of  inflation,  introduce  great uncertainty for prospective  investors  who are 
exposed to international-or  in this context, interregional-trade.  In reaching 
an overall  judgement on the merits of a regime of exchange rate flexibility, the 
possible negative effects of this uncertainty  on investment must be balanced 
against  the  occasionally favorable  effect  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  on 
reducing the costs of adjustment. 
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Comment  Stanley Fischer 
Peter Kenen argues in this interesting and stimulating paper that much of the 
policy coordination literature misses the point. Drawing a distinction between 
policy-optimizing  and regime-preserving  coordination, he develops the argu- 
ment that policy coordination in practice  is directed mainly to regime pres- 
ervation, and not to policy optimization. 
The distinction  between policy-optimizing  and regime-preserving  coordi- 
nation is suggestive but elusive. Policy optimization is the standard approach 
followed  in  the  coordination literature.  In  that  framework,  the  gains  to 
coordination may be examined under either fixed or floating rates. The analyst 
would then be able to rank outcomes in a two-by-two matrix, resulting from 
combinations of coordination versus noncoordination under fixed and floating 
exchange rates. 
Kenen’s analysis in this paper confines itself  to two of  the possible four 
boxes  in  that  matrix,  namely those in which countries do not  coordinate 
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policies. His analysis implies that fixed exchange rates are, in this noncoor- 
dinated mode, preferable to floating in the face of three types  of  shocks (a 
permanent  shift  in  portfolio  preferences  between  the  countries’  bonds,  a 
temporary  increase  in  one  country’s saving  rate,  and  a  balanced  budget 
increase in one government’s spending) and not clearly worse in the face of 
two other shocks (a permanent  switch in demand  for the goods of the  two 
countries  and  a  permanent  increase  in  the  stock  of  bonds  in  one  of  the 
countries). The analysis is carried out in a portfolio-balance-type  model with 
static expectations. 
Kenen’s conclusion is that fixed exchange rates are preferable to floating 
rates. He assumes that governments will share this conclusion and that they 
will therefore engage in policies designed to preserve fixed exchange rates. 
This  behavior,  he  suggests,  is better  thought  of  as cooperative  rather  than 
coordinating. He also argues that we should more generally interpret various 
types of  policy coordination  or cooperation  as resulting from governments’ 
attempts to preserve institutional arrangements that they regard as being on the 
whole helpful. 
The distinction between the choice of regime and the question of  whether 
coordination is preferable within  a given regime is worth emphasizing. De- 
cisions about coordination  may be necessary  in  some regimes, but handled 
automatically in others: for instance, the issue of fiscal policy harmonization 
has to be negotiated within  the European Community,  but is handled auto- 
matically in the U.S.  federal system. Similarly, one of the benefits of a fixed 
exchange rate system may be that it calls forth automatically the monetary 
and/or fiscal policies necessary  to maintain fixed rates. 
Nonetheless,  Kenen’s  analysis  does  not  directly  address  the  important 
question of how the regime is chosen. He shows that fixed exchange rates are 
better in some circumstances (namely, with noncoordination, in his model) and 
then  suggests that  is  why  we  observe governments  cooperating  to  smooth 
exchange rates. But why do governments not cooperate, having the best of both 
worlds by holding exchange rates fixed in response to some shocks and varying 
them in response to others? The answer must have to do with: the simplicity 
for the government of carrying out a fixed exchange rate rule compared with 
the difficulties of coordinating on a more complicated rule; the difficulties of 
identifying particular  shocks; and the effects on expectations  of  adopting  a 
simple rule. 
It is suggested in Kenen’s note 7 that the public goods aspect of exchange 
rate stability could be included in the ordinary policy optimization literature 
by including exchange rate stability as an argument of  the utility function of 
each government. This is formally true, but it would not make sense to do so 
unless the conclusion that exchange rate stability is desirable came from some 
economic or broader political  economy analysis rather than being arbitrary. 
Beyond the analytics,  the paper also presents insightful comments on the 
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takes  issue  with  the  relevance  of  the  Barro-Gordon  analysis  of  dynamic 
inconsistency to the international context. He suggests that governments do not 
renege on agreements they  have reached with other governments, using the 
Bonn Economic Summit Agreement as an example. While governments are 
reluctant to renege on formal agreements, it appears that the U.S. government 
has held out the prospect of a reduction in its fiscal deficit as its share of the 
repeated  agreements  to support the  dollar  since  1985 but  has  not  actually 
moved fast on this front. 
It is not entirely clear how the distinction between regime-preserving and 
policy-optimizing  coordination  relates to the  current debate. We  are in the 
current situation because governments were not willing in the late sixties and 
early seventies to preserve the fixed exchange rate regime. They are undoubt- 
edly trying to preserve or maximize something through their current efforts at 
coordination, but it is difficult to see what regime is being preserved. It is not 
the fixed exchange rate regime; perhaps as Kenen suggests, modem coordi- 
nation is intended to preserve the international trading system. 
Current  differences  in  attitudes  to policy  coordination  are  colored  most 
strongly by views of the success or failure of the Bonn Summit of 1978, and 
on the consequences of international policy coordination since  1985. Propo- 
nents of policy coordination regard the Bonn Summit as a success, even though 
it soured German policymakers’ views of the process. They believe that their 
expansionary moves in  1978 were partly responsible for the high inflation in 
1979. Their failure to expand  in  1986 despite urgings  from abroad can be 
attributed  to  the  earlier  experience, and  can also be  regarded  ex post  as 
appropriate. 
One view of coordination since 1985 is that it has succeeded by bringing the 
dollar down smoothly, preventing  a hard  landing, and permitting continued 
growth of the international economy. Alternatively, coordination has been the 
cover under which other countries finance the U.S. budget and trade deficits, 
thereby protecting the United States from the consequences of its fiscal policy. 
I believe the latter view is more appropriate,  and that without the particular 
type of coordination practised since 1985, the U.S. would already have been 
forced into more fundamental fiscal contraction. 
However, there is not too much point in blaming policy coordination for this 
outcome. It  is not coordination  per  se that  is to blame, but rather the fact 
underlying  the  coordination-the  desire  of  other countries  not to have  the 
dollar depreciate too rapidly against their currencies. 
One can compare the effects of exchange rate coordination since 1985 with 
international policy coordination over the debt crisis. In each case, coordina- 
tion prevented rapid adjustment of an underlying disequilibrium.  In the debt 
crisis,  debtors  and  creditors  would  by  now  have reached  a settlement  had 
official intervention not occurred.  In each case, international policy  coordi- 
nation reduced the risks to the international economy but did so at the cost of 
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It is these tendencies that lead critics to suggest that the reflex belief in the 
values of  international  policy  coordination  is unwise. In  principle, optimal 
international policy coordination  cannot hurt. In practice it sometimes does. 
This view is strengthened by the fact that proponents of  international policy 
coordination are at their most vociferous when they want to change domestic 
policies  of  which  they  disapprove, and  which they  hope  to affect  through 
international action. 
The right approach to international policy coordination is suggested by the 
analysis on which Peter Kenen embarks in this paper:  first design a system 
which is robust to noncoordination, undertake automatically those policies that 
are needed to sustain the system, and consider other policies and coordinated 
policy actions on a case-by-case basis. 